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Using longitudinal data on fathers and their children, this study compares
the extent of intergenerational mobility in Germany and the United States
and introduces an estimation strategy that corrects estimates of intergenera-
tional earnings elasticities for a possible lifecycle bias. In contrast to previous
studies, we ﬁnd that the extent of intergenerational mobility is more limited
in the US than in Germany. Furthermore, while the errors-in-variables prob-
lems have been dealt with extensively in the literature, the inconsistencies
in standard mobility measures due to lifecycle eﬀects have attracted much
less attention. The present paper proposes an estimation method that cor-
rects for such inconsistencies. The extent of this lifecycle bias is found to be
strong in Germany but only modest in the US. Keywords: Intergenerational
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11 Introduction
At least since the times of the French Revolution it has become a widely accepted belief in
Western and most other countries that advancements within a society’s social hierarchy
should not, or only to a minor degree, depend on descent but on personal attitudes
and capabilities. In economics the question whether a society is “open” or whether its
class boundaries are rather “tight” is studied using the capacity to earn a high income
as proxy for an individual’s social ranking. From this perspective the intergenerational
earnings elasticity, that is, the correlation of log lifetime earnings between, say, fathers
and sons gives valuable insights about the openness of a society and also allows for a
comparison of the functioning of societies over time and space.
The distinction between income and earnings is crucial in this context because, it
appears again to be common belief, the bequest of wealth does not by itself oppose the
general notion of openness; however, when going along with unequal chances to earn a
good (labour) income, it does. So the central question is how strongly lifetime earnings
of family members are correlated.
Although one is interested in estimating the intergenerational correlation of log life-
time earnings, the researcher observes earnings only over relatively short time periods.
Using “snapshots” as proxies for lifetime earnings is unproblematic if and only if one is
willing to assume that lifecycle earnings proﬁles are reasonably similar for all individuals.
Then, the main problem that remains is the prevalent attenuation bias due to the likely
mismeasurement of fathers’ lifetime earnings (Solon 1989).
A further concern with this procedure using “snapshots” as proxies is that periodic
earnings can convey a very misleading picture of the true lifetime earnings if wage growth
over the lifecycle is quite diﬀerent for diﬀerent groups of people. This point was already
raised in Jenkins (1987) and more recently further elaborated by Haider and Solon (forth-
coming) and Grawe (forthcoming). The argument is easily understood when considering
the most simple case in which there are only two types of workers. Let wage growth be
greater for high-skilled than for low-skilled workers and at the same time assume that
lifetime earnings of the former exceed those of the latter. Then it is easy to show that
standard estimators of the intergenerational earnings elasticity are downward inconsis-
tent. Notice that this problem (in contrast to the attenuation bias) would even persist
if the process generating periodic earnings was deterministic and not stochastic!
The present paper adds to the literature on intergenerational earnings elasticity in
several ways. First, we estimate earnings elasticities between fathers and sons while
explicitly allowing diﬀerent skill groups to have diﬀerent wage growth over the lifecycle,
2thus eradicating possible lifecycle biases. Second, making standard assumptions about
the income-generating process over the lifecycle we can use a much bigger data set than
is commonly used to estimate earnings elasticities, thus limiting the attenuation bias.
Third, as does Couch and Dunn (1997), we apply the same estimation strategy on both
German and US data to obtain estimates of intergenerational earnings elasticities for
both countries which allows us to compare the openness of both societies.
As usual in empirical research, we have to deal with the problem that there is not
enough good data available so as to eliminate lifecycle eﬀects in a completely satisfactory
manner. Ideally we would want to use earnings data of at least two generations of
persons over their full lifecycle. Since this ideal data is not available (neither in the
surveys used here, nor in administrative data) we have to make some assumptions about
the data generating process that allows us to draw inference about a person’s earnings
in a given year even when it is not observed. Otherwise we cannot hope to learn about
individual lifetime earnings and to estimate intergenerational earnings elasticities that
are not biased due to variation in lifecycle earnings proﬁles. The assumption we make
here is that we can learn from the observed wage growth of fathers about the future
wage growth of their sons and, vice versa, from the observed wage growth of sons about
the unobserved but most likely wage growth of their fathers while they were young.
The data we use in this study comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and the Cross-National Equivalent File
(CNEF). Still ignoring lifecycle eﬀects, we estimate the intergenerational earnings elas-
ticity to be 0.24 using German and 0.34 using US wage data. These estimates are
considerably higher than the estimates of 0.11 and 0.13 for Germany and the US previ-
ously reported in Couch and Dunn (1997). However, the US estimate is still somewhat
lower than the “reasonable guess” of 0.4 found in Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992).
Allowing wage growth to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent skill groups, we estimate earning
elasticities of 0.31 in Germany and 0.36 in the US. Thus, at least in the German data
we ﬁnd strong indication of a severe downward lifecycle bias. In the US, by contrast,
lifecycle eﬀects do not aﬀect the estimated earnings elasticity by very much. Finally, we
also correct lifetime earnings for an eﬀect that has not attracted very much attention in
this literature, namely that highly qualiﬁed workers enter the labour market a few years
later than low qualiﬁed workers. So a comparison of wages of both types of workers
when both skilled and unskilled workers are economically active, most likely leads to
overestimating the actual lifetime earnings of both groups. Taking also account of this
eﬀect, we estimate the intergenerational earnings elasticity to be 0.27 in Germany and
0.34 in the US. Based on CNEF data, the respective estimate of the earnings elasticity
3in Germany is 0.19 and 0.29 in the US. So independent of our estimation method and
the data sets used, we conclude that the German society is more “open” than is the US
society.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main estimation
strategy of this paper. In this section we also discuss the interpretation of the standard
log-linear relationship between lifetime earnings of fathers and sons because we believe
the interpretation suggested for example in Solon (1999) misses some important features
of human capital and should therefore be modiﬁed. Moreover, this section discusses in
more detail the expected direction of the lifecycle bias. Section 3 describes the data used
in this study. Section 4 brieﬂy describes how the estimation strategy is implemented and
thereby prepares for section 5 which presents the estimation results and discusses their
interpretation. We check for robustness of these results in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Econometric Model and Direction of the Bias
Because of the strong link of income with consumption and welfare, measuring the
intergenerational mobility in income is of direct interest to economists. Concentrating
on father-son relationships, a popular way to link both the lifetime incomes of fathers
(Y father
i ) and sons (Y son
i ) is
logY son
i = α + β logY father
i + εi (1)
where εi is a white-noise error term and the index i denotes family or dynasty i. In
this speciﬁcation the coeﬃcient β measures the elasticity of a son’s lifetime income with
respect to his father’s lifetime income.
A positive correlation of total incomes within families is suggested by the famous
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model which assumes perfectly altruistic agents. Variants of
the stochastic version of this model can be found in Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) where
it is stressed that parents usually invest into human capital of their children rather than
bequeathing other forms of assets. Nonetheless, this strand of the literature presumes
that parents can invest any amount into the future of their oﬀspring. Important aspects
or features of human capital such as, e.g., education or vocational training are however
only imperfectly divisible. Taking this indivisibility into account, though, leads to a
diﬀerent interpretation of Y father
i and Y son
i because when the number of, say, professions
is ﬁnite and, associated with this, there is a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent training costs,
then all households would earn identical labour incomes as long as capital markets are
4perfect.1 Therefore, in this setting a relation between Y father
i and Y son
i —as suggested
by (1)—is plausible (with a non-zero β) only when interpreting incomes very broadly,
including asset incomes.
In the literature on intergenerational mobility, however, both Y father
i and Y son
i are
usually interpreted as labour earnings. Explanations for a positive correlation of within-
family labour earnings that explicitly assume a ﬁnite number of professions usually draw
on the ﬁnding that capital markets are imperfect or even completely missing (e.g., Galor
and Zeira 1993, Freeman 1996, Ljungqvist 1993, Mookherjee and Ray 2003, Mookherjee
and Ray 2002). Imperfect capital markets imply that training may be more costly (in
utility terms) for the poor than for the rich which can result in imperfect equalisation
of lifetime labour earnings. More recently it has been shown that similar results can
be obtained even with perfect capital markets. For example, poor families can have
a relatively low incentive to invest into training of their children if during schooling a
minimal standard of living needs to be attained (Funk and Vogel 2003) or if some goods
(e.g., consumption goods or prestige of occupations) are only imperfectly divisible (Funk
and Vogel 2006).
In this paper we follow most of the literature (cited for example in Becker and
Tomes 1986, Solon 1999, Solon 2002, Bj¨ orklund and J¨ antti 1997, Grawe forthcoming)
and estimate the correlation between lifetime labour earnings of fathers and sons. Life-
time labour earnings of a member of family i born in period b who enters and leaves the
labour market at age T
entry
ib and respectively Texit








where r is the (constant) discount rate and Yibt denotes this person’s period t earnings.
We discount to the age 25 because this will be the earliest age for which we use earnings
observations. For notational convenience write Y 0
ib for annual earnings of member b of
family i when he is 25 years old.
Notice that earnings in period t can always be written as
Yibt = Y 0
ib × egibt(t−b−25)
where gibt denotes the average growth rate of earnings over the interval (b + 25,t). In-
1Similarly, in Becker and Tomes (1986) all parents invest identical amounts into human capital if capital
markets are perfect and for small investments return on investment in human capital exceeds return
on investment in physical capital.
5serting this expression into (2) and taking logs yields







e(gibt−r)(t−b−25)dt = logY 0
ib + φib (3)
By deﬁnition, the variable φib depends on gibt, T
entry
ib , and Texit
ib . In the literature income
at the reference age (here 25) comes under many diﬀerent names, for example “adjusted
current status” (Zimmerman 1992), “permanent component” reﬂecting the “true long-
term earnings capacity” (Mazumder 2005), or “‘permanent’ component of log annual
earnings” (Solon 1992), just to mention a few. The important point to stress here is
that when using income at the reference age (logY 0
ib) as a proxy for lifetime income
(logYib), in general the obtained estimate ˆ β is inconsistent. In fact, consistency is in
general obtained only as long as φib is identical for all sampled individuals.
The standard practise to estimate the “permanent component” (see for instance
Zimmerman 1992) is to ﬁrst estimate the income-generating function
logYibt = logY 0
ib + Xibtα + νibt
where the errors νibt are mean independent of both “permanent component” and the
other covariates X, which are usually a polynomial in age.2 Taking averages via
\ logY 0
ib = logYibt − Xibtˆ α
then yields unbiased estimates of individual income at the reference age. With only few
observations available per person, estimates of “permanent component” may be quite
imprecise leading to the famous attenuation bias (see, e.g., Solon 1989, Solon 1992,
Bj¨ orklund and J¨ antti 1997).
If in the above earnings function wage growth and thus the vector α is identical for
all individuals and in addition entry and exit age are also the same, then the φ’s are
identical as well. So when making these assumptions, the standard procedure to use the
“permanent component” as a proxy for lifetime earnings in (1) is justiﬁed.3 However,
if diﬀerent, say, skill groups have diﬀerent earnings growth rates (diﬀerent α), the so
obtained estimates of β are in general inconsistent.
Adjusting the income-generating function to obtain unbiased estimates of logY 0
ib is of
2Notice that this kind of model does not allow to identify age or experience eﬀects if age or experience
interacts with the skill level. So in these instances the income-generating function is in fact a stripped-
down version of a Mincer wage equation.
3To my knowledge Minicozzi (2003) is the only study that allows for group speciﬁc earnings proﬁles.
6course simple; one only has to lift the restriction that the vector of coeﬃcients (α) is
identical for all skill groups. But the important point to notice here is that this is not
suﬃcient to eradicate the source of the inconsistency. In fact, improving our estimates of
the “permanent component” may actually make things worse, not better. If diﬀerent skill
groups exhibit diﬀerent earnings growth rates over their lifecycle, to obtain consistent
estimates of β in general we need both good estimates of individual earnings at the
reference age and the correctly estimated φ-terms (as shown in (3)). The direction of
the induced bias when falsely ignoring the φ-terms is discussed next.
Diﬀerences in earnings growth Consider two individuals born in period 0, one of which
is high-skilled and the other is low-skilled. Both enter the labour market at age 25. Panel
(a) of Figure 1 depicts the lifecycle earnings proﬁles of these two persons where wage
growth is assumed to be constant but not identical. Instead, we let earnings growth be
steeper for the skilled than for the unskilled person. Knowledge of both the income in
the base period (“permanent status”) and the growth rate of wages allows us to compute
lifetime earnings of both persons.
Notice that it is always possible to construct an earnings proﬁle that yields identical
lifetime earnings for the skilled person but with the relatively low wage growth of the
unskilled person if we suitably adjust the skilled person’s annual earnings at the begin-
ning of his lifecycle. In the ﬁgure such a hypothetical earnings proﬁle is indicated by
the dashed line. The distance between both parallel wage curves reﬂects the diﬀerence
in lifetime earnings between the two persons. It is identical to the diﬀerence in annui-
tised lifetime earnings and thus crucial for the estimation of intergenerational earnings
elasticities.
The ﬁgure also shows that this distance is understated (overstated) when using annual
earnings of very young (old) individuals. Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows the resulting direc-
tion of the bias of ˆ β when ignoring these diﬀerences in earnings growth of both (groups
of) persons. In the graph it is assumed that sons are only observed shortly after entering
the labour market and fathers only shortly before leaving it. The dashed line depicts
the regression line when not correcting for lifecycle diﬀerences in earnings while the solid
line shows the true relationship in lifetime earnings of fathers and sons. Since the diﬀer-
ence in lifetime earnings of skilled and unskilled fathers (sons) is over(under)estimated,
the slope of the dashed regression line unambiguously understates the true correlation
between fathers’ and sons’ lifetime earnings. Adding the correct φ to the permanent
earnings of each individual (as indicated by the arrow) corrects for this bias.
7Diﬀerences in training periods Next let growth rates of both workers be identical but
assume that low skilled workers enter the labour market at age 20 while high skilled
workers spend ﬁve more years in education. Then observed earnings when both are 25
years old clearly overstate the actual diﬀerence in lifetime earnings. So again we need to
adjust annual earnings at the reference age to take account of the late entrance to the
labour force of skilled workers. Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows that otherwise the obtained
estimate of β would be upward inconsistent: Since lifetime earnings of both skilled
fathers and skilled sons are overestimated by the same amount, ˆ β is upward inconsistent
if the true slope coeﬃcient is below one.
3 Data
We use two diﬀerent original data sets, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for
Germany and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the US—as does Couch
and Dunn (1997). The PSID began in 1968. Until 1997 interviews were conducted
annually, since then biannually. The GSOEP started to interview individuals of selected
households in 1984. Since then individuals are interviewed on an annual basis. The
important feature of both data sets is that children of original households are followed
when moving out from their parents’ home and forming their own household. Both data
sources include variables that allow to easily establish links between family members,
thus making it possible to relate earnings variables of fathers and sons. A detailed
description of the PSID can be found in Hill (1992) and of the GSOEP in SOEP Group
(2001).
As for the US, we only use observations from the Survey Research Center (SRC)
component of the PSID. With respect to Germany, we refrain from using data from
individuals who used to live in East Germany prior to the fall of the Berlin wall in
November 1989.4 To limit measurement error of reported earnings, which may be severe
in the early and late stages of the lifecycle, we only use observations on men who are
between 25 and 60 years old.5 Moreover, we discard observations from men for which
earnings are observed in less than 5 years. With respect to fathers this is done to reduce
the attenuation bias, with respect to sons to keep the sample homogenous.
4In this study we are concerned quite generally with the openness of the German society. With the fall
of the iron curtain chances to rise in the income ladder increased dramatically for people from the
former East Germany (especially for the young migrating to the West) such that this single event is
expected to seriously confound our estimates. We therefore use data exclusively from West Germans.
5Notice that this last restriction does not render it impossible to gauge diﬀerence in lifetime earnings
that are due to entering the labour market early. The speciﬁcation of the income-generating function
still allows to infer incomes of men below 25.
8The US earnings variable we use covers non-imputed wage and salary earnings of
the head of the household which is reported in the PSID in all waves 1970-2003. For
Germany our income measure comes from the monthly calendar information on wage and
salary payments of employed workers. Earnings are aggregated into yearly earnings to
which we add reported bonus payments. This measure of annual labour earnings can be
computed in all currently available waves 1984-2005. Following Couch and Dunn (1997)
we drop observations with earnings less than 100 real dollars, respectively, Euros. In
the PSID data as from 1988 we also drop observations that are reported to be censored,
but at extremely large censoring bounds (1 million or, as from 1994, 10 million dollars).
This leaves us with a sample of 525 sons from 421 fathers in the GSOEP and 876 sons
from 563 fathers in the PSID.
Another earnings variable we use is on individual labour earnings as provided in the
Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF). Among other data sources for other countries,
the CNEF uses data from the PSID and the GSOEP to generate variables that are
supposed to be by and large comparable across countries (for a description of the CNEF
see Burkhauser, Butrica, Daly and Lillard 2001). Individual labour earnings in the
CNEF follow a broader concept of labour earnings. Most importantly, it covers earnings
of both employed and self-employed workers. As before, only non-imputed values are
used in the analysis. CNEF data is available for all GSOEP waves but, for the PSID,
only for the waves 1980-2001. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the key variables
used in this study.
Education qualiﬁcation in both Germany and the US are aggregated into four groups.
In the US we group individuals into high school drop-outs, high school graduates, people
with some college, and college graduates. Persons of these groups are assumed to enter
the labour market at the age of 18, 19, 22, and 24, respectively. In Germany the
grouping follows naturally from the German educational system: men without vocational
training, with vocational training, with further higher education6, and with a degree from
university or technical college. They are assumed to enter the labour market at age 18,
20, 23, and respectively 25. In both countries all men are assumed to leave the labour
market at the age of 60. In both countries skill group two is the largest group and
therefore referred to as the reference group.
All earnings data in this study are deﬂated to year 2000 prices using the Consumer
Price Index for each country. To discount annual earnings we use the average inﬂation-
adjusted Treasury Bill Rate of the years 1983-2004 which is 2.1 per cent in the US and
6Many of this group are civil servants who have ﬂatter earnings proﬁles than university graduates. So
it does not seem adequate to merge this group with the group of university graduates (see Figure 3).
92.6 per cent in Germany.
4 Estimation Strategy
Estimation of the intergenerational earnings elasticity β proceeds in two steps. In a ﬁrst
step we estimate lifetime earnings and in the second step we use these results to estimate
β.
Step 1 As argued in section 4, to obtain estimates of lifetime earnings we need to
estimate both individual earnings at the reference age and the φ-terms. Estimating
the φ’s in turn requires estimation of the complete lifecycle earnings proﬁle of both
generations, that of the fathers and that of the sons. Sons’ (fathers’) earnings are
mostly observed in the early (late) stages of their careers, so we make the identifying
assumption that earnings proﬁles of both sons and fathers are identical. Moreover, we
follow most of the literature in assuming that age eﬀects can be represented by a second-
degree polynomial in age. To correct for cohort eﬀects, we further assume that income
increases linearly in time.7 The income-generating function can then be written as
lnYibt = lnY 0
ib + α1Aibt + α2A2
ibt + γt + νibt (4)
Making this assumption on the functional form of the earnings function, observations
from all men in the data for which earnings are observed in at least ﬁve waves while
being in the admissible age range 25-60 can actually be used in the estimation of (4).
Importantly, the fact that for most men in the data a father-son link cannot be estab-
lished does not invalidate the assumption that also for these men the statistical process
generating annual earnings is described by the above equation. But using data of all
men who appear to be comparable to persons for which such a father-son link can be
established results in increased precision of the estimates ˆ α1, ˆ α2, ˆ γ, and hence of the
individual eﬀects (earnings at age 25) of fathers and sons and of the φ-terms.8
7This functional form assumption might appear extremely restrictive, especially in the light of empir-
ical studies that ﬁnd large shifts in the remuneration of younger cohort (Card and Lemieux 2001).
However, using ﬁve-year intervals to aggregate cohorts and using dummy variables to indicate these
groups does not aﬀect our ﬁrst step estimations by very much. We therefore use the simple linear
form.
8There is the chance that sample attrition is not random and that persons for which earnings are
observed only very few times are not perfectly comparable to persons whose earnings are observed
for at least 5 years. We therefore refrain from using observations on these men also in the ﬁrst-step
estimations.
10Step 2: In the second step we use the estimates of Step 1 to compute lifetime earnings
of both fathers and sons. These are then inserted into equation (1) to estimate β.
Notice that in this second step estimates of lifetime earnings are used to obtain the
estimate ˆ β. Although such simple two-step estimators of the coeﬃcients as used here are
consistent, the uncorrected second-stage standard errors are not (see Pagan 1986, Newey
and McFadden 1994). We therefore use the bootstrap (with 500 replications) to compute
standard errors of all two-step estimates.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Step 1: estimating lifetime labour earnings
Equation (4) is estimated using OLS. For our purpose a comparison of wage growth over
the lifecycle is crucial and therefore in Table 2 we only report the obtained ˆ α1. In the
upper panel we report ˆ α1 when all three coeﬃcients in (4) are assumed to be identical
for all four skill groups. In contrast, the lower panel of the table shows the coeﬃcients
when this restriction is lifted and instead α1, α2, and γ are allowed to diﬀer across
skill groups. There are three things to notice of the results in Table 2. The ﬁrst is the
large number of persons used in the estimations and also the large number of average
observations per person. Remember that we use all observations from men aged between
25 and 60 for which we observe earnings in at least ﬁve years. Still, the average number
of observations per person is more than twice as large.
A second interesting insight to be gained from Table 2 is that earnings growth is very
diﬀerent for diﬀerent skill groups. The general pattern is the higher educated a person
is, the greater his expected earnings growth in the early stages of his career. The results
of the pooled estimations reported in the upper panel are actually somewhere in the
middle of the respective results of the unrestricted estimations in the lower panel of the
table. The third ﬁnding to notice is that there is much more variation in earnings growth
between skill groups in Germany than in the US. Thus, by the argument developed in
section 4, the lifecycle bias is expected to be more severe in Germany than in the US.
The lifecycle bias is the larger, the greater lifetime earnings of high skilled fathers
(sons) are exaggerated (understated) when falsely running the pooled estimations instead
of allowing the coeﬃcients in (4) to diﬀer across skill groups. Table 3 reports logs of
annuitised lifetime earnings of fathers and sons for two skill groups, medium skilled
persons (the reference group: High School graduates in the US and men with vocational
training in Germany) and high skilled persons (persons with a completed college or
university education). Annuities are reported instead of lifetime earnings because the
11formula




allows easy conversion of the latter into the former and annuitised incomes are easier
to compare with actually observed annual earnings. Notice that in Table 3 it is always
assumed that for each skill group the entry age Tentry is the same as that of the reference
group. So for both fathers and sons the diﬀerences in estimated log annuitised earnings
of the two skill groups is identical to the respective estimated diﬀerences in log lifetime
earnings.
The numbers in Table 3 reﬂect strong diﬀerences between the US and the German data.
First, due to the relatively stronger wage growth of high skilled workers in Germany (as
compared to the wage growth of low skilled workers), the estimated average log annuities
of high skilled workers dramatically diﬀer whether we use the pooled or the unrestricted
version of equation (4). Comparing the estimates in columns 3 and 4 of the table, in the
US when pooling skill groups, annuities of high skilled fathers are overstated by 0.07 log
points while that of high skilled sons are understated by 0.05 log points. By contrast,
in Germany annuities of high skilled fathers are overstated by 0.19 log points and those
of high skilled sons understated by 0.11 log points. Using CNEF earnings data, the
diﬀerences between German and US data is even more striking. In the German section
of this data annuities of high skilled fathers (sons) are over(under)stated each with 0.22
log points. Compared with these strong diﬀerences the diﬀerences of 0.03 and 0.05 log
points in the case of high skilled fathers and, respectively, sons in the US is rather
modest.
Second, with the noticeable exception of the PSID sample, in all other samples both
estimation methods yield roughly identical estimates of annuities of medium skilled men.
In the PSID sample, by contrast, annuities of medium skilled fathers seem to be strongly
overestimated when pooling skill groups. Taking together, these ﬁndings suggest that
allowing for lifecycle eﬀects does make a diﬀerence for the estimated intergenerational
earnings elasticity, particularly so for the earnings elasticity in Germany.
5.2 Step 2: intergenerational earnings elasticities
The main results of this paper are presented in Table 4. In the upper panel of the table
we report ˆ β when earnings of both fathers and sons are required to be observed in at
least ﬁve years. For each sample we report ˆ β for four diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model.
In the ﬁrst two rows we show the estimates when in Step 1 wage growth is assumed to
be identical for all four skill groups while in the following two rows this constraint is
12removed. In both cases β is estimated holding the entry age to the labour market ﬁxed
(at the entry age of the reference group) and allowing the entry age to vary. Estimates
in the ﬁrst row of the table are best comparable to the estimates usually reported in
the literature (see, e.g., Solon 1999, 2002) and therefore (and for that reason only) are
referred to as our benchmark estimates.9
The ﬁrst thing to observe of the results in Table 4 is the strong diﬀerence between
estimated intergenerational earnings elasticity in Germany and the US. While in our
benchmark estimation we obtain an estimate of 0.235 in the GSOEP sample, in the
PSID sample this estimate is 0.343. The latter estimate is only somewhat lower than
0.4, the “reasonable guess of the intergenerational elasticity in long-run earnings for
men in the United States” (Solon 1999). It is certainly much lower, though, than the
guess of 0.6 noted in Mazumder (2005)—even though in the present study the average
number of observations used per father is more than three times as large as in most
other studies, thus limiting the unavoidable attenuation bias. The estimates from both
CNEF samples support this ﬁnding that, when compared to the US, the German society
is relatively open. Again the obtained ˆ β is found to be much larger in the US (0.293)
than in Germany (0.104).
A second important ﬁnding is that taking account of diﬀerences in wage growth over
the lifecycle can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the estimated β coeﬃcients and thus can result in
arriving at very diﬀerent conclusions about a society’s openness. In fact, in both German
samples we ﬁnd the lifecycle bias to be of signiﬁcant magnitude. Compared with the
benchmark estimates where we lump together all skill groups, in the GSOEP sample the
estimated β increases by more than 30 percent to 0.304. In the CNEF the estimate more
than doubles! In both US samples for which diﬀerences in wage growth between skill
groups were found to be much smaller than in Germany, estimates of β also increase, but
only modestly. In both the PSID and the CNEF sample ˆ β increases by only 4 percent
to 0.357 and, respectively, 0.306.
Thirdly, assuming that men with more years of schooling enter the labour market at
a later age is also found to have a strong impact on the obtained estimates. In this
speciﬁcation the estimates of β reduce strongly in both German samples (for instance,
in the GSOEP sample ˆ β decreases from 0.235 to 0.200 in the pooled and from 0.308 to
0.266 in the unconstrained estimation) and somewhat less strongly in the US samples.10
9Remember in the benchmark speciﬁcation φ-terms are identical and hence ignoring them does not
aﬀect the estimated intergenerational earnings elasticity.
10In both CNEF sample the obtained estimates are about 20 log points lower than in the speciﬁcation
with a ﬁxed entry age. But the relative impact of this change is lower in the US data because of the
higher US benchmark estimate.
13Summarising, in all three modiﬁcations of the benchmark speciﬁcation we ﬁnd the es-
timate to be biased in the direction that was expected from the theoretical discussion in
section 4. The magnitude of the lifecycle bias however diﬀers strongly between samples.
Allowing for diﬀerences in earnings growth over the lifecycle has a much greater impact
on the obtained ˆ β in the German than in the US samples. In fact, in the US lifecycle ef-
fects on the intergenerational earnings elasticity are modest. So with respect to the large
number of studies using US data, the standard procedure of simply ignoring a possible
lifecycle bias when estimating β does not seem to lead to very misleading conclusions
about the general “openness” of the US society. Finally, the ﬁndings of this section
suggest that the German society is signiﬁcantly more open (with respect to earnings
potential) than is the US society. Taking account of diﬀerences in both wage growth
and training periods, using wage data we estimate ˆ β to be 0.266 in Germany which
compares to an estimate of 0.337 in the US. Using labour earnings of both employed and
self-employed workers ˆ β is 0.189 in Germany and 0.285 in the US.
Small father-son sample A major improvement in the estimation of intergenerational
earnings elasticities in the early 1990s (Solon 1992, Zimmerman 1992) was to reduce the
downward inconsistency by averaging fathers’ earnings over up to ﬁve years. Ideally,
one would like to average over as many years as possible, but this comes at a cost of
a severe reduction in degrees of freedom and of an increased likeliness that the sample
becomes less representative due to non-random sample attrition. By now many more
waves of data have become available and our estimation method actually allows to make
use of all available earnings data. So we re-estimate the model using only men for which
we have at least ten valid earnings observations.11 The obtained estimates of β of this
subsample are presented in the lower panel of Table 4.
Looking at the benchmark estimates when using wage data from the GSOEP and the
PSID (columns (2) and (3)), we ﬁnd that the estimated earnings elasticities increase
strongly. In the GSOEP ˆ β increases by 75 percent from 0.235 to 0.413, while in the
US data it increases by only 12 percent from 0.343 to 0.398. Still holding entry ages
ﬁxed at the entry age of the reference group but allowing for skill speciﬁc wage growth
over the lifecycle, the increase in ˆ β is not as dramatic, though still sizeable. In the
German sample ˆ β increases from 0.308 to 0.453 (47 percent increase), while in the US
the estimate changes from 0.357 to 0.406 (10 percent increase). These ﬁgures actually
suggest that both the German and the US society are comparably open.
11Again, to reduce the errors-in-variable bias we are interested in using as many observations of fathers
as possible. But to keep the sample in the estimation of Step 1 homogenous, we also require sons’
earnings to be observed at least ten times.
14Also in the CNEF data ˆ β increases signiﬁcantly when using the more restrictive and
much smaller subsample. In the German CNEF data the benchmark estimate more than
doubles (from 0.104 to 0.256) while for the US the estimate only increases from 0.293
to 0.379. In total, taking account of both lifecycle eﬀects, compared with the estimates
based on the large father-son sample the diﬀerence in openness between the German
and the US society diminishes strongly from 0.96 to 0.48 log points—though still not
overturning our earlier verdict that the society in Germany is more open than the US
society.
5.3 Age-dependence of intergenerational earnings elasticities
The strategy in this paper to correct for lifecycle biases is to add skill-speciﬁc components
(the φ-terms, see equation (3)) to the estimated annual earnings at the reference age
(here 25). A diﬀerent way to eliminate the lifecycle bias would be to take out skill-speciﬁc
age eﬀects in such a way that the obtained skill-speciﬁc diﬀerences in average annual
labour earnings would reﬂect the underlying overall wage diﬀerences between the skill
groups (see also the ﬁne presentation of this argument in Haider and Solon forthcoming).
So the idea is to ﬁnd a speciﬁc age such that at this age the diﬀerence in observed annual
earnings by and large reﬂects the diﬀerence in lifetime earnings.
Suppose such an age could be found, which is always possible with only two skill
groups (see Figure 1). Then taking this age as the reference age (instead of choosing
ad-hoc 25 as the reference age) eliminates the lifecycle bias the same way as does adding
the constant skill-speciﬁc components to the estimated individual annual earnings at the
age of 25. In other words, the just proposed two-step estimator of β is consistent even
without correcting estimates of annual earnings at the reference age once we correctly
specify the reference age.12 Remember however that even then we would still have to
allow for skill-speciﬁc growth rates or use only earnings that are actually observed at
the reference age.
Figure 3 plots estimated lifetime wage proﬁles for all four skill groups for both Germany
and the US (based on GSOEP and PSID data with a minimum of ﬁve wage earnings per
person). The thick lines show the estimates of log annual earnings when not restricting
wage growth to be identical. The thin lines depict estimated earnings proﬁles with
presumed identical wage growth (and so run parallel in both graphs). The level of each
thin line is chosen such that for each skill group the implied lifetime earnings are the
12Notice however that this approach is not more eﬃcient (in the statistical or the computational sense)
than the estimation strategy followed earlier because it still requires estimation of lifetime earnings
to determine the correct reference age.
15same for both (thick and thin) earnings proﬁles.13 Results are only plotted for the
speciﬁcation with identical entry ages.
Apart from showing the much wider wage dispersion in the US, the interesting ﬁnding
from Figure 3 is that in both countries and in all skill groups the thick and thin lines
intersect when individuals are about 35 years old. This ﬁnding suggests that the lifecycle
bias stressed in this paper can be expected to become extremely small—even without
adding the φ-terms to the estimated individual ﬁxed eﬀects—when one chooses 35 as
the reference age.
For high wage earners, who are predominantly high skilled, above the age of 35 their
annual earnings in general exaggerate their lifetime earnings while the opposite is true
for low skilled persons who mostly also earn low wages. Therefore, with fathers being
almost always above 35 when their wages are observed in the survey, Figure 3 leads us
to conclude that the estimated ˆ β should be the smaller, the higher the average age of
the fathers in the sample. This is exactly what Grawe (forthcoming) ﬁnds. However
while the explanation in Grawe is centred around the assumption that wage growth of
sons exceeds that of their fathers, we base our argument on the ﬁnding that high-skilled
persons have high lifetime earnings and high wage growth.
6 Robustness
The present section explores the robustness of our results presented in Table 4. We ﬁrst
check the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to changes in the presumed interest
rate. Second, we conduct some experiments that attempt to gauge the magnitude of the
error-in-variable bias and, doing so, to disentangle its impact from possible eﬀects that
are due to non-random sample attrition. Third, checking for outliers we compare the
OLS estimates with the results from median regressions.
Interest rates The estimates in Table 4 turn out to be robust to reasonable changes in
the interest rate. If the assumed interest rate is greater than the true one, the relatively
high earnings of the low skilled while being young are exaggerated while their relatively
low earnings are understated; the opposite is true for the high skilled. Both results in a
downward bias of the estimate of β. This is exactly what we ﬁnd in the data, though
the magnitude of the changes is extremely small.
13Denote the estimate of φ when pooling observations of all skill groups as ˆ φ
0 and the respective estimate
of skill group j = 1,2,... as ˆ φ
j. Then lifetime earnings of the two earnings proﬁles are identical when
we add ˆ φ
j − ˆ φ
0 to the average individual ﬁxed eﬀects of each skill group j.
16We only discuss the results for GSOEP and PSID samples where the minimal number
of valid earnings observations is ﬁve. In the US the real interest rate (r) we use for
discounting is 2.1 percent, so we re-estimate all models presuming interest rates of 1.5
and 2.5 percent. Since the interest rate only enters the φ-terms, the benchmark result
(0.343) is unaﬀected by variation in r. For the other three speciﬁcations the range of
estimates of β (presuming ˆ β is monotonous in r) is (0.317,0.321) when wage growth
is identical for all skill groups but entry ages vary, (0.356,0.359) when wage growth is
diﬀerent but entry age is held ﬁxed, and (0.333,0.342) when both wage growth and entry
age are allowed to vary.
In Germany where the wage growth eﬀect is found to be signiﬁcantly larger, changes
in the underlying discount rate have a somewhat larger eﬀect on ˆ β. The range of re-
sults of the four speciﬁcations of the model is (0.235), (0.197,0.203), (0.306,0.312), and
(0.260,0.274). The results thus appear robust against misspeciﬁcation of interest rates
of reasonable magnitude.
Errors-in-variables bias vs non-random sample selection The fairly large number of
observations per person in the father-son sample (see Table 1) allows to conduct a set
of experiments that attempt to gauge the magnitude of the attenuation bias which is
expected to downward-bias all of the β-estimates. The idea behind these experiments
is to randomly select ﬁve observations per person from the available data and then
to re-estimate the model. This procedure is repeated 500 times. Mean and standard
deviations (not to be confused with standard errors) of the distribution of the obtained
estimates are reported in Table 5.
In the ﬁrst experiment earnings from ﬁve diﬀerent waves are randomly selected for
each father and each son. If transitory ﬂuctuations of individual earnings are auto-
correlated, averaging over consecutive observations leads to a smaller reduction of the
errors-in-variable bias than would be expected with white noise error terms (Zimmerman
1992, Mazumder 2005). In a second experiment we therefore draw random samples of
ﬁve consecutive observations per person from the father-son sample. With the number
of father-son pairs suﬃciently large, the diﬀerence between the estimated earnings elas-
ticities of both experiments should be the greater, the stronger the autocorrelation of
transitory ﬂuctuations. Moreover, such diﬀerences become more and more visible, the
greater the number of observations per person such that the samples drawn in the two
experiments are actually reasonably diﬀerent from each other. We therefore conduct the
two experiments in both samples, the one with a minimum of ﬁve and the other with a
minimum of ten observations per person.
17For brevity Table 5 only records the results of these experiment for the speciﬁcations
where entry age is held ﬁxed. The ﬁrst observation to be made is that with one exception
all estimates are smaller than their counterparts in Table 4. Using only ﬁve instead of all
available observations per person increases the noise-to-signal ratio and thereby leads to
a reduction in the probability limit of ˆ β. The ﬁnding that almost all estimates in both
experiments are smaller than the actual estimates reported in Table 4 can be interpreted
as reﬂecting this attenuation bias.
Second, we ﬁnd that in both US samples the estimates in Experiment 2 are always
smaller than the estimates of the ﬁrst experiment. We interpret this as evidence for
substantial autocorrelation of the error terms in both US samples. In both German data
sets it is not so straightforward how to interpret the results because almost half the
reported estimates of the second experiment exceed those of the ﬁrst.
Finally, notice that the reported estimates in the lower panel of Table 5 are always
signiﬁcantly larger than the respective estimates in the upper panel. This happens to be
the case despite the fact that in both samples and in both experiments we always select
exactly ﬁve observations per person. If the diﬀerence in estimates in the upper and lower
panel of Table 4 was largely due to the attenuation bias, then in both experiments this
diﬀerence should vanish. However, it does not. We interpret this ﬁnding as evidence
that both samples, the father-son sample with a minimal number of ﬁve and ten earnings
observations per person, are subject to diﬀerent sample selection procedures. That is,
lifetime earnings of fathers and sons who continue to report their earnings year after
year seem to be higher correlated than lifetime earnings of fathers and sons of which a
sizeable fraction is going to soon leave the sample.
In this sense the ﬁndings of tables 4 and 5 suggest that there might be a trade-oﬀ
between the precision with which we can hope to estimate individual earnings and the
representativeness of the sample. In view of this trade-oﬀ and the fact that other “better”
(such as administrative) data usually does not allow to link family members, corrections
of inconsistent estimates, as for instance proposed by Mazumder (2005), might be the
best way out of the dilemma that more data is not always a good thing.
Median regression Second-step estimates are also computed using median regression
(MR) because quantile regressions are less sensitive to possible outliers. All four data
sets used in this study show huge variation in earnings of both fathers and sons (see
Table 1). From the data it is impossible to judge whether this actually reﬂects the un-
derlying earnings distribution or, at least to some extent, comes from measurement error.
Notwithstanding dropping many so-called “censored” earnings in the PSID, particularly
18in the PSID, but also in the other data sets, though to a minor degree, there are some
extremely large labour incomes casting the quality of these particular observations into
doubt. When drawing our main conclusions we therefore want to limit the impact of
these possible outliers on the obtained estimates of β. MR is one way to do that.
The MR results are in general comparable to those reported in Table 4, both in
magnitude and in relation to each other. Here, we only report the MR estimates of the
benchmark model. Beginning with the GSOEP for which the OLS estimate of the large
father-son sample (where the requirements on the minimal number of observations is
ﬁve and thus less restrictive than in the small father-son sample) reported in Table 4 is
0.235, the respective MR estimate is 0.216 (standard error 0.040). In the small father-
son sample the MR estimate of 0.389 (SE 0.105) is again only somewhat lower than the
respective OLS estimate of 0.413. In the PSID data the MR estimate of the big father-
son sample is 0.365 (SE 0.038) and thus quite similar to the OLS estimate of 0.343. In
the small sample MR yields an estimate of 0.401 (SE 0.047) which is extremely close to
the OLS result of 0.398. In the German CNEF data the MR estimates of the large and
the small father-son sample are 0.108 (SE 0.053) and respectively 0.243 (0.072). Finally,
the two MR estimates of the US CNEF data are 0.294 (SE 0.036) and 0.418 (SE 0.046)
which are again very close the OLS estimates reported in Table 4.
Also in the speciﬁcations in which wage growth of skill groups is not constrained to
be identical, MR and OLS estimates are of similar magnitude. The MR estimates of the
big and small father-son sample are 0.287 (SE 0.047) and respectively 0.427 (SE 0.098)
in the GSOEP, 0.376 (SE 0.044) and respectively 0.418 (SE 0.046) in the PSID, 0.193
(SE 0.050) and respectively 0.356 (SE 0.091) in the German section of the CNEF, and
0.320 (SE 0.039) and respectively 0.424 (SE 0.049) in the US section of the CNEF. In
the light of these in general quite similar MR and OLS estimates, we draw the conclusion
that the results reported in Table 4, and thus the main conclusions of this paper, are
reasonable robust against possible outliers in the data.
7 Conclusion
This study compares intergenerational mobility in Germany and the US and introduces
an estimation strategy that corrects estimates of intergenerational earnings elasticities
for a possible lifecycle bias. In contrast to a previous study (Couch and Dunn 1997),
we do ﬁnd evidence for American exceptionalism—in the sense that the US society is
comparatively rigid.
Our estimates of the intergenerational earnings elasticity in Germany and the US that
19are best comparable to previous studies are 0.24 and 0.34, respectively. The US estimate
seems close to the “reasonable guess” (Solon 1992) of around 0.4, but it should be kept
in mind that this “guess” was rather a lower bound of the “true” earnings elasticity.
In contrast, in the present study we use a lot more observations per person such that
here the attenuation bias can be expected to be much smaller. So our estimate of 0.34
suggests that the US is actually quite a bit more mobile than other more recent studies
indicated. Still, regression to the mean appears to be much slower than the studies
surveyed in Becker and Tomes (1986) suggested.
The lifecycle bias aﬀects the estimates of both countries very diﬀerently. We ﬁnd
diﬀerences in earnings growth between skill groups in both countries, though the varia-
tion in wage growth is estimated to be much stronger in Germany than in the US. This
translates into a much more pronounced increase in the earnings elasticity in Germany
than in the US once we take account of these diﬀerences in growth rates of earnings in
the estimation of β. While the German estimate increases by 0.07 log points to 0.31,
the US estimate only increases by a modest 0.02 log points to 0.36.
With the estimates of average lifetime earnings of each skill group at hand, it is
straightforward to determine the reference age for which diﬀerences in observed annual
earnings most closely reﬂect the diﬀerences in lifetime earnings. We ﬁnd this age to
be 35. This ﬁts remarkable well with the results of other studies (Haider and Solon
forthcoming, Mazumder 2005) that also ﬁnd that, when used as a proxy for lifetime
earnings, the predictive power of annual earnings is the greatest at around the mid or
late 30s.
To gauge the magnitude of the remaining attenuation bias, which has attracted so
much attention in this literature, we further conduct a series of experiments. For each
father and each son in the sample we randomly select ﬁve out of all available observa-
tions and then re-estimate β. The diﬀerence in the obtained average estimates of the
experiments and our previous estimates then provides some insight into the underlying
attenuation bias. In the German data we do not ﬁnd evidence for serially correlated
error terms, but in the US data we do. The results from these experiments by and large
support the simulation results reported in Mazumder (2005)—though our estimates sug-
gest that Mazumder’s attenuation coeﬃcient with δ = 0.3 better describes the data than
his “plausible” value of 0.5.
The attenuating eﬀect of right-side measurement error on the estimated slope coeﬃ-
cient becomes the more visible in these experiments, the more observations per person
are used in the main regressions. We therefore also estimate the model using a more
selective subsample where a father-son pair is used only if earnings of both are observed
20at least ten times. The striking ﬁnding from this exercise is ﬁrst that the obtained ˆ β’s
are much larger than in the bigger and less selective sample and second that this increase
does not vanish when conducting the experiments. So there seems to exist a trade-oﬀ
between two evils: The smaller the downward inconsistency due to the errors-in-variables
bias, the more selective and thus, the ﬁndings suggest, the less representative the sample.
If this proves to be true also in future research, correcting the estimates from nationally
representative samples in a way as, for instance, proposed by Mazumder (2005) might
be the best one can hope for.
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24Table 1: Summary statistics
GSOEP PSID CNEF (D) CNEF (US)
Son’s average age 30.4 33.1 30.4 32.0
(2.45) (3.63) (2.45) (3.29)
[27-42] [26-54] [27-42] [27-44]
Son’s real earnings 31,562 42,689 30,115 43,275
(12,098) (31,382) (13,138) (28,843)
[2,597-134,891] [1,527-465,677] [2,078-143,447] [1,617-392,034]
Son’s log real earnings 10.26 10.39 10.12 10.43
(0.36) (0.59) (0.52) (0.56)
[7.8-11.7] [7.2-12.2] [7.2-11.7] [7.3-12.6]
# obs. per son 10.0 14.2 10.1 12.1
(4.0) (6.79) (3.9) (4.9)
[5-22] [5-31] [5-22] [5-20]
# sons 525 876 609 619
Father’s average age 50.4 47.9 50.6 51.4
(4.69) (6.05) (4.58) (4.85)
[30-58] [28-59] [35-58] [33-58]
Father’s real earnings 33,752 48,334 33,525 55,797
(16,862) (32,708) (17,104) (52,801)
[7,208-219,753] [4,512-401,209] [8,917-202,995] [4,716-606,513]
Father’s log real earnings 10.33 10.55 10.29 10.62
(0.36) (0.62) (0.42) (0.67)
[8.7-12.2] [7.5-12.2] [8.9-11.9] [7.6-13.1]
# obs. per father 12.2 17.5 12.1 12.6
(4.9) (7.2) (5.0) (4.9)
[5-22] [5-31] [5-22] [5-20]
# fathers 421 563 486 400
Note: Numbers in round parenthesis are standard deviations and those in square brackets denote the
range of observed values. The panel is unbalances so the here described distributions are distributions
of averages for each person. See text for a description of wage and earnings data. Years for which
information on earnings are available are as follows: GSOEP 1983-2004, PSID 1969-2002, CNEF (D)
1983-2004, CNEF (US) 1979-2000. For Germany and the US earnings are reported in, respectively, Euros
and US dollars of year 2000 (using the consumer price index of the US and, respectively, Germany).
25Table 2: Step 1 estimates of α1
GSOEP PSID CNEF (D) CNEF (US)
pooled estimation
.033 .046 .053 .055
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.002)
53,072 88,225 56,908 65,886
5,089 6,801 5,462 5,473
unrestricted estimation
No qualiﬁcation .019 .037 .030 .039
(.002) (.004) (.003) (.006)
11,389 17,627 11,724 9,965
1,043 1,567 1,074 945
High School (US) / Vocational Training (D) .026 .036 .039 .037
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.004)
26,434 29,256 27,957 22,530
2,562 2,313 2,710 1,922
Some College (US) / Higher Vocational Training (D) .040 .047 .047 .046
(.004) (.003) (.005) (.005)
4,939 19,694 5,708 15,905
476 1,498 546 1,306
College (US) / University (D) .067 .067 .119 .066
(.004) (.003) (.006) (.004)
10,310 21,648 11,519 17,486
1,008 1,423 1,132 1,300
Note: Cluster robust standard errors in round parenthesis. The following two numbers are the number
of observations and the number of persons used in the respective estimation. Sample consists of men
aged 25-60 with at least 5 valid observations of individual wage or earnings.
26Table 3: Estimated average log annuity of lifetime earnings
GSOEP PSID CNEF (D) CNEF (US)
Sons:
medium skilled pooled 10.28 10.23 10.19 10.34
(0.016) (0.029) (0.025) (0.035)
unrestr. 10.26 10.22 10.15 10.32
(0.016) (0.032) (0.024) (0.033)
# 287 298 323 213
high skilled pooled 10.43 10.71 10.19 10.76
(0.045) (0.030) (0.052) (0.037)
unrestr. 10.54 10.76 10.41 10.81
(0.042) (0.031) (0.047) (0.037)
# 97 301 129 209
Fathers:
medium skilled pooled 10.27 10.34 10.18 10.31
(0.024) (0.041) (0.028) (0.055)
unrestr. 10.27 10.21 10.20 10.28
(0.024) (0.038) (0.027) (0.047)
# 178 186 211 123
high skilled pooled 10.73 10.86 10.65 10.96
(0.063) (0.049) (0.060) (0.057)
unrestr. 10.54 10.79 10.43 10.93
(0.062) (0.044) (0.058) (0.052)
# 53 136 64 110
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. Men aged 25-60 with at least 5 valid observa-
tions of individual earnings. Entry age is ﬁxed, that is, persons of both skill groups are assumed to
enter the labour market at age 19 in the US and at the age 20 in Germany.
27Table 4: OLS Estimates of β from Log Lifetime Earnings Data
GSOEP PSID CNEF (D) CNEF (US)
(1983-2004) (1969-2002) (1983-2004) (1979-2000)
minimal number of observations: 5
pooled
entry age ﬁxed 0.235 0.343 0.104 0.293
(0.053) (0.050) (0.067) (0.036)
entry age ﬂexible 0.200 0.319 0.081 0.270
(0.056) (0.050) (0.070) (0.036)
unrestricted
entry age ﬁxed 0.308 0.357 0.211 0.306
(0.059) (0.053) (0.066) (0.037)
entry age ﬂexible 0.266 0.337 0.189 0.285
(0.059) (0.054) (0.066) (0.037)
# fathers/sons 421/525 563/876 486/609 400/619
minimal number of observations: 10
pooled
entry age ﬁxed 0.413 0.398 0.256 0.379
(0.075) (0.045) (0.072) (0.053)
entry age ﬂexible 0.374 0.372 0.228 0.359
(0.078) (0.046) (0.072) (0.054)
unrestricted
entry age ﬁxed 0.453 0.406 0.348 0.383
(0.077) (0.043) (0.083) (0.053)
entry age ﬂexible 0.399 0.388 0.320 0.368
(0.079) (0.044) (0.084) (0.054)
# fathers/sons 132/156 328/490 157/187 156/222
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. In the US High School drop-outs are
assumed to enter the labour market at age 18, High School graduates at 19, men with some
college at 22, and college graduates at age 24. In Germany entry ages of the four education
qualiﬁcations less than secondary education, vocational training, higher vocational training,
and university are respectively 18, 20, 23, and 25. Entry age is said to be ﬁxed if it is
assumed that all men enter the labour market at the entry age of the reference group which
are High School graduates in the US and men with vocational training in Germany. Interest
rates in the US are set at 0.0208 and in Germany at 0.0259.
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Note: The light thin lines are 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. See Table 2 for sample size of the plots.
2
9Table 5: Robustness checks: attenuation bias vs sample selection
GSOEP PSID CNEF (D) CNEF (US)
minimal number of observations: 5
pooled
Experiment 1 0.227 0.322 0.096 0.276
(0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.013)
Experiment 2 0.236 0.298 0.127 0.268
(0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.018)
unrestricted
Experiment 1 0.283 0.326 0.188 0.277
(0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.013)
Experiment 2 0.288 0.302 0.210 0.269
(0.022) (0.021) (0.029) (0.018)
minimal number of observations: 10
pooled
Experiment 1 0.388 0.378 0.253 0.340
(0.027) (0.023) (0.044) (0.030)
Experiment 2 0.384 0.346 0.307 0.312
(0.041) (0.032) (0.055) (0.036)
unrestricted
Experiment 1 0.425 0.388 0.341 0.349
(0.027) (0.023) (0.047) (0.029)
Experiment 2 0.407 0.357 0.287 0.321
(0.042) (0.031) (0.058) (0.035)
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. Entry age ﬁxed (see note of Table 4).
Experiment 1: Random selection (without replacement) of exactly 5 observations
for each person in the sample. Experiment 2: Random selection of 5 consecutive
observations for each person in the sample.
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